Collective Stupidity as Peter Sloterdijk's Spheres
Collective Stupidity as Peter Sloterdijk's Spheres
IntroductionThis text is a speculation about the stupidity of community formation as presented by Sloterdijk in the first part of his book Bubbles Spheres: Microspherology I. This text is not about modernism nor about post-modernism, nor about other projects or aeshtetics. It is a turnover of the idea that smart ideas lead to smart results and a provocation in which the term intelligence is merely substituted with the term stupidity in order to go through the thought process, to riff with the ideas, and to then examine the results at some later date. The text then starts with writing and slowly devolves into mere quotes that seem to make sense in the context.
To understand the stupidity of the collective is essential when thinking about collective intelligence, this should be obvious to anyone working or even living actively in any group formed out of a majority of people. Rather than thinking that what Sloterdijk presents as being how collectives and communal spheres are formed as good, I would like to propose that this Platonic avant-garde academy is the epicentre of stupity. This of course is a rather crude way of dismissing thousands of years of collective evolution, but based on the evidence of human effect on itself and other species is warranted.
The Singular PluralSloterdijk uses the image of the soap bubble to illustrate how the breath can be transportet away and outside of the body that forms it withot becoming a 'Cartesian subject', as he puts it, 'remaining planted on its extensionless thought-point while obscrving an extended thing on its course through space.' (pp. 19) In other words, to me it can be seen to extend psyche, clearly connecting with the Platonic need for eros in the formation of the bubble as marked by the insciption mentioned in footnote two.
What is at stake is concentration and attention and in this context it is interesting that Sloterdijk asks (but does not answer) the question whether it is ' legitimate to imagine that everything which exists and becomes relevant is someone's concern?' (pp. 19) The attention of the individual being in relation to another singularly is what creates a single bubble around the two. In other words what is created is a cell. Using Jean-Luc Nancy's concept of interruption to suplement the notions presented by Sloterdijk, there can be two types of destructions of the cell which lead to different results even when both are caused by external forces rather than internal ones.
In Inoperative Community Jean-Luc Nancy describes the way in which myth is able to interrupt a community and form a gathering by which the community can coagulate and remain constant in time. This is very similar to Sloterdijk who places God at that healm rather than the singer of the myth. That '[A]nyone who studies the course of the past ten millennia with regard to the creation of peoples must conclude from the evidence that wherever there afe peoples, divine heavens to form these peoples cannot be far away.' (pp. 58)
In the initial argument 'inspiration' or breath, the breath that extends by the concave of the bubble, is essential in the formation of community. Nancy on the other hand places it entirely in the relations of beings, and the song, while coming from the outside never leaves the earth. These two concepts converge to be almost identical in the passage from Franz Kafka quoted by Sloterdijk: 'Leopards break into the temple and drink to the dregs what is in the sacrificial pitchers; this is repeated over and over again; finally it can be calculated in advance, and it becomes part of the ceremony.' (pp. 55)
Meaning that the violence done on the community by external forces can be integrated into the community in order to retain the community. Thus instability, negotiation, and acceptance of the unavoidable reality of the situation allows for sustaining the community withot replicating the violence from the outside. The external then becomes the inspiration that keeps alive a people who are in competition for resources. (pp. 57) To quote a longer passage:
'Through ethnotechniques spanning generations, tens and hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions of individuals are attuned to superior collective spirits and particular rhythms, melodies, projects, rituals and fragrances. By virtue of such formal games, which produce a shared and productive sensuality, the collected many keep finding the proof of their destiny to be together, ev-en under adverse conditions; where this proof becomes powerless, discouraged people dissolve within stronger cultures or decline into rioting bands and childless leftover group. Because of its exaggerated aim, the task of enclosing such absurdly large numbers of people in unifYing systems of delusion sounds like an impossible demand. Mastering precisely such difficulties, however, was obviously part of the logic of the way in which peoples were actually formed. In the historical world, it seems, the more improbable option develops an inclination to assert itself as the realer one. How implausible and impossible the mere existence of a united mass like a people seems from the perspective of the primal hordes-the cultural synthesis of a thousand or ten thousand hordes-yet it is the peoples who made history, sucked up the hordes and demoted them to mere families or houses.' (pp. 58)
Unlike Nancy who sees myth as rhetoric and narrative Sloterdijk recognizes that 'brute force' that had a 'catalytic role in ethnopoietic ptocesses' rather than merely words. (pp. 59) Meaning that while he accepts Nancy's notion of the myth has proven to be a more 'to be effective guarantees of longer-lasting edmospheric animation ell-ects; one could say that they ensure syntheses of peoples a priori.' (pp. 59) While this is a priori, meaning that it is already formed in the childhood relations between the baby and her mother, that [A]t its beginning, every life goes through a phase in which a mild two-person illusion defines the world. Caring ecstasies enclose mothers and children in an amorous bell whose resonances remain, under all circumstances, a precondition for a successful life.' (pp. 61) Thus because of this pscychology of intimacy established already in infancy and behavioral structures the violence that acts as the catalyst from the ouside can (in the first place) become myth rather than collective crippling trauma.
Spherology'In spherological terms, peoples appear above all as communities of cult, arousal, effort and inspiration. As autogenous vessels, they live and survive only under their own atmospheric, semiospheric bell jat. Through their gods, their stories and their arts, they supply themselves with the breath-and thus the- stimuli-that make them possible. In this sense, they are successful pne.umotechnic and auto-stressory constructs. By lasting, peoples prove their ethnotechnic genius ipso facto. And although the individuals within peoples pursue their own concerns in relative obliviousness, overarching myths, rituals and self-stimulations still create sodal fabrics of sufficient ethnic coherence, even from the mosr resistant material. Such endogenously stressed collective bodies are spheric alliances that drift in the current of the ages. That is why the most successful sphere-forming communities, the religion-based folk traditions or cultures, have survived for centuries with impressive ethnospiritual constancy.' (pp. 59) 
'Early on, however, rhe unified two become related to third, fourth and fifth elements; as the singular life ventures out of its initial shell, additional poles and larger spatial dimensions open up, each defining the extent of the developing and developed connections, worries and participation. In fully-grown spheres, forces are at work that draw the individual inm an illusion shared by millions. It seems impossible to live in large societies without yielding in some measure to the delirium of one's own tribe. From the outset, therefore, spherology examines the risks involved in transference processes from micro- to macropsychoses. What it considers above 'all else, however, is the exodus of the living from the real and the virtual mother's womb into the dense cosmoses of the regional advanced civilizations, and beyond these into the non-round, non-dense foam worlds of modern global culture. In this, our account follows the Romanesque idea of describing the world as a glass bead game, even if, conditioned by its subject, ir will take away the weightlessness of this motif. Spheres are forms as forces of destiny~from the fetal marble in its private, dark waters to the cosmic-imperial ball that appears before us with the supremely confident aim of con taining and rolling over us.' (pp. 61)
'Once spheres are elevated to a theme as effective forms of the real, the perspective of the world's form reveals the key to its symbolic and pragmatic order. We can explicate why, wherever people think in large round forms, the idea of self-sacrifice inevitably gains power. From time immemorial, the massive globes that present mortals with their comforting roundness have demanded that whatever does not fit into the smooth curvature of the whole should be subordinated to them: flISe of all the stubborn, cumbersome, private ego, which has always resisted complete absorption into the great round self. The forces of empire and salvation find rheir obligatory aesthetic in the circle. Hence our phenomenology of spheres is forced by the obstinacy of its theme to overturn the morphological altar on which, in imperial times, the non-round was always sacrificed to the round. On the largest scale, the theory of spheres leads into a critique of round reason.' (pp. 61-62)
Critiquing this critique of round reason is precisely the stupidity of collectivities.
The Stupid CollectiveTo say that a collective is stupid differs from a discurse about collective stupidity, it is a statement of a collective rather than about collectives in general. If I were to follow Sloterdijk in asserting that psychological comes before politics (in which he turns around the non-sphere becoming a sphere into the sphere becoming a non-sphere) I should first attempt to grapple the stupid collective and only after that could I approach collective stupidity. Intimacy of personal relations would then act as a stepping stone towards a general understanding of stupid functioning in general. In order to full fill the thought process established at the start I must say that both approaches are stupid, since neither by definition can be intelligent, but nevertheless it needs some examining to see if there are directions and times and spaces that stick out in the examination of the subject.
The stupid collective is one that self-harms. Self-harm can emerge from multiple reasons such as trauma, ignorance, behavioral triggers, and so forth, whereever it emerges from it is fundamental in the stupidity of a person before it enters into the stupidity of a collective. In terms of Sloterdijk's disruption of the attention away the bubble self-harm in the internal individual causes a disruption that cannot be integrated into the larger bubble because its energy is not concentric but exentric, meaning that it emerges from the centre and moves outwards rather than emerging from the outside and moving towards the centre.
The stupid collective is the one that makes mistakes.
The stupid collective is one that externalizes themselves through technology in an effort to influence the inside from the outside.
The stupid collective is one that
The stupic collective is one that creates violence but also the one that does not: 'There is no traditional empire that failed to secure its borders by cosmological means, and no ruling body that did not discover the instruments of political immunology for itself. What is world history if not also the war history of immune systems? And the early immune systems -were they not always militant geometries too? ' (pp. 65)
The stupid collective is the one the privilages a single sense and therefore in one mode of knowledge: 'Once one has gained an idea of terrestrial globalization as the basic process of the Modern Age, it can be made clear why a third globalization, triggered by the rapid images in the networks, is currently leading to a general space crisis. This is indicated by the concept, as famiuar as it is opaque, of Virtuality.' (pp. 66)
A stupid collective is one that spreads rather than moves. Sloterdijk claims that the world is no longer a sphere but has turned into foam and the foam is chaotic but does not move. ' Referring to a pathology of spheres displays a threefold focus: a politicological one, in so far as foams tend to hl' ungovernable structures with an inclination towards morphological anarchy; a cognitive one, in so far as the individuals and associations of subjects can no longer produce any complete world, as the idea of the whole world itself, in its characteristically holistic emphasis, unmistakably belongs to the expired age of metaphysical total-inclusion-circles, or monospheres; and a psychological one, in so far as single individuals in foams tend to lose the P0\Vef to form mental-emotional spaces, and shrink to isolated depressive points transplanted into random surroundings (correctly referred to systemically as their environment). They suffer from the immunodeficiency caused by the deterioration of solidarities-to say nothing, for the moment, of the new immunizations acquired through participation in regenerated sphere creations. For sphete-deficient private persons, their lifespan becomes a sentence of solitary confinement; egos that are extensionless, scarcely active and lacking in participation stare out rhrough the media window into moving landscapes of images. It is typical of the acute mass cultures that the moving images have become far livelier than most of their observers: a reproduction of animism in step with modernity.
In fact, the soul in the non-round age mUSt, even under the mOst favorable conditions, be prepared for the fact that for the single bubbles, the self-completing, released individuals who furnish their personal spaces medially, the hybrid global foam will remain something impenetrable; at least navigability can partially replace transparency. ' (pp. 73)
Collective Stupidity' The notion of human participation in such a provision of transparency released imperial and monologic forms of reason; the world as a whole was illuminated by the circumspection that ruled from the center. God Himself was nothing but the center and the perimeter of the orb of being that was projected and viewed by Him, and all thought that ba~t:d itself on Him shared analogously in the sublimity of His central view. In the foam worlds, however, no bubble can be expanded into an absolutely centered, all-encompassing, amphiscopic orb; no central light penetrates the entire foam in its dynamic murkiness. Hence the ethics of the decentered, small and middle-sized bubbles in the world foam includes the effort to move about in an unprecedentedly spacious world with an unprecedentedly modest circumspection; in the foam, discrete and polyvalent games of reason must develop that learn to live with a shimmering diversity of perspectives, and dispense with the illusion of the one lordly point of view. Most roads do not lead to Rome-that is the situation, European: recognize it. Thinking in the foam means navigating on unstable currents-others would say that it changes, under the impression of the thought tasks of the time, into a plural and transversal practice of reason.' (pp. 75)
'It is the inanimable outside that gives food for thought in intrinsically modern times. This conclusion will inevitably drive the nostalgic yearning for a conception of the world, which still aims for a livable whole in the educationholistic sense, into resignation. For whatever asserts itself as the inner realm, it is increasingly exposed as the inner side of an outside. No happiness is safe from endoscopy; every blissful, intimate, vibrating cell is surrounded by swarms of professional disillusioners, and we drift among them-thought paparazzi, deconsuuctivists, interior deniers and cognitive scientists, accomplices in an unlimited plundering of Lethe. The rabble of observers, who want ro take everything from without and no longer understand any rhythm-have we not long since become part of them, in most matters and at most moments? And how could it be any different? Who could inhabit in such a way that they inhabit everything? Or in such a way that they do not interfere in anything exterior? The world, it seems, has grown much too large for people of an older type, who strove for true community with things both near and far, The hospitality of the sapiens beings towards what arose behind the horizon has long been strained beyond the critical level. No institution, not even a church that thought kata holon and loved universally-Iet alone an individual who reads on bravely-----.can imagine that it is sufficiently open for everything that infiltrates, speaks and encounters it; viewed from any point in our lifeworld, the vast majority of individuals, languages, works of art, commodities and galaxies remain an unassirnilable outside world, by necessity and forever. All "qstems," whether households, communes, churches or states-and especially couples and individuals-are damned to their specific exclusivity; the zeitgeist celebrates its responsibility-free connivance in the external multiplicity with increasing openness. Intellectual history today: the endgames of external observation. ' (pp. 75)
Thinking The Interior'The revolution of modern psychology does not stop at explaining that all humans live constructivistically, and that everyone of them practices the profession of the wild interior designer, continually working on their accommodation in imaginary, sonorous, semiotic, ritual and technical shells. The specific radicality of the sciences of human psychology only becomes manifest when they interpret the subject as something if that not only arranges itself within symbolic orders, but is also taken up ecstatically into the shared activity of arranging the world with others. It is not only the designer of its own interior, filled with relevant objects; it must also, constantly and inevitably, allow itself to be placed as a friendly furnishing in the container of the dose and closest inner parties. Conse~ quenrly, the relationship between human subjects sharing a field of proximity can be described as one between restless containers that contain and exclude one another' (pp. 84-85)
'In the physical space, it is impDssible for something within a container simultaneously to contain its container. It is equally inconceivable to imagine a body in a container as something that is excluded from that very container. It is precisely with relationships of this type, however, that the doctrine of psychological space deals from the start. This notion, an insurmountable paradox in geometric and physical terms, is the poim of departure for the doctrine of psychological at human locators: individuals are subjects only to the extent that they are partners in a divided and assigned subjectivity. If one wished to take this to its precarious limits and revive Platonic intuitions in contemporary formulations, one could say: every subject is the restless remaindet of a couple whose missing half never ceases to make demands on the one left behind.' (pp. 85)
'The truth and wisdom of modern psychology with regard to such phantasms of impregnabJe inwardness or sovereign outwardness lies in its description of the human space as an intertwining of several interior spaces; here the surreal becomes the real. Every subject in the real consubjective space is containing, in so far as it absorbs and grasps orher subjective elements, and contained, in so far as it is encompassed and devoured by the circumspections and arrangements of others. The real human proximity field is thus more than a simple system of communicating vessels; if your fluid rises in my tubes and vice versa, this is only the first indication of what allom humans. to affect one another at dose range through their joins and overflows. As a system of hybrid communicating vessels, the human interior consists of paradoxical or autogenous hollow bodies that are at once tight and leaky, that must alternate between the roles of container and content, and which simultaneusly have properties of inner and outer walls. Intimacy is the realm of surreal autogenous containers.' (pp. 87-88)
' intimacy, beyond its first sugary experience, can only be understood as an inscrutability within the most obvious. The theory of the intimate set in motion with the following microsphere analysis is dedicated to showing that all human sciences have always collected contributions to a topological surrealism, because ir was never possible to speak of humans without having to deal with the various aimlessly wandering poetics of the inhabited interior. The spaces that humans allow to contain them have their own history-albeit a history that has never been told, and whose heroes are el) ipso not humans themselves, but rather the topoi and spheres as whose function humans Bourish, and from which they fall if their unfolding fails.' (pp. 90)
'For many intelligences, the thought of homely intimacies is associated with a spontaneous disgust at roo much sweetnesswhich is why there is neither a philosophy of sweetness nor an elaborated ontology of the intimate.' (pp. 90)
'An intellect that spends its energy on worthy objects usually prefers the sharp to the sweet; one does not offer candy to heroes.' (pp. 90)
'Even the most harmless oral enjoyment causes something that will remain unacceptable for the freedom hero: the sweetness-in-me experience casts the enjoying subject out of the center and places it, for a few precarious yet welcome moments, on the fringe of an autocratic taste sphere.' (pp. 93)
'The most basic luxury food is suitable to convince me that an incorporated object, far from coming unambiguously under my control, can take- possession of me and dictate its topic to me. If a banal case of sugar consumption already hollows out the subject through the flaring up of an aroma presence, however, and makes it the scene of invasive sensualities, what is to become of the subject's conviction that its destiny is self-determination on all fronts? W'hat remains of the dream of human autonomy once the subject has experienced itself as a penetrable hollow body? ' (pp. 93-94)
'It would seem that, in such questions, the roles of self-will amI rapture are inverted, and that the weakling insists on his own power while the strong one abandons himself. Should we not precisely understand the strongest subject as the most successful metabolic agent-the person who makes the least secret of his hollowness, penetrability and mediality? Should not the most decentered individual accordingly be understood as potentially the most powerful? And did the central psychological model of modernity, the ego-strong self-realizer, not step on the scene as a polyvalent metabolism-maximizer who surrenders himself to multifarious invasions, seductions and appropriations under the mask of controlled COnsumer power? Does not the entire universe of human intimacy, the web of divided interiors in the literal and metaphorical sense, grow from such inversions of appropriative-incorporative gestures( Do we, as phenomenologists, psychologists and topologists, not have-to start from the observation that from the outset, subjects always form themselves through the experience of being "taken at their taking"? The constitutive candy, which epi-Freudian psychoanalysts have both viewed with suspicion ahd deified since the time of Melanie Klein, is none other than "the marher's breast," that alleged first "object" (note the singulat) which the child (which is no more able to count to two than an objectrelationship theorist) cannot accept and incorporate without reaching, in its way, the limits of the milky ball of sweetness within it. The early subject-should one deem it merely a gleeful observer on the periphery of a euphoric gulp?
Such considerations have troubling consequences for the doctrine of the human being, as they break with the illusion of circulating ego-delimitation systems. The point of this game on the I-you and I-it boundaries39 can be clarified via a mythological thought experiment. If candies and portions of mother's milk were subjects, not mere things-if they were benign demons, for example-it would not be extravagant to claim that they take possession of theit consumers, setding inside them like occupiers who plan to stay for good. This would undoubtedly be a sound method to deduce the animation of the in/ans from its interaction with demons; then receiving a soul would simply mean becoming involved in a profitable obsession through spirit contact and productive incorporations. The notion of demonic possession is not available to a modern psychological theory, of course, although the circumstances themselves-the opening and population of a divided intimate space-are such that a discreet demonology would probably be its most fruitful interpretation.40 Is it not, in fact, the whispering of nymphs' voices to the subject from its earliest states thar unlocks its inner dimensions?4.1 Does not every unneglected child realize the advantage of being born only thanks to eudemonic nipples, good candy spirits, conspiratorial bottles and drinkable fairies that watch discreetly by its bed, occasionally entering the interior to nurse it? Does a sum of advantageous invasions not hollow out a love grotto within the individual, with enough space to house the self and its associated spirits for life? Does not every subjectiflcation, then, presuppose multiple successful penetrations, formative invasions and interested devotions to life-enriching intruders? And is not every feeling of offensive self-positing injected with anger over missing the chance at being taken?' (pp. 95-96)
'The category of the intimate discussed here deals exclusively with divided, consubjective and inter-intelligent interiors in which only dyadic or muitl-poled groups are involved-and which, in fact, can only exist" to the extent that human individuals create these particular spatial forms as autogenous vessel'S through great closeness, through incorporations, invasions, intersections, interfoldings and resonances (and, in psychoanalytical terms, also identifications). This intimate vault system as a whole in no way corresponds to the unconscious as understood in depth psychology, for access to it is gained neither through a particular listening technique nor the insinuation of a latent meaning that manifests itself in halting speech, nor through the assumption of unconscious wish production. Readers can easily convince themselves that the dimensions of interiority spread our in this microspherology are, in their structure, worlds apart from the serial three-roam-apartments of the Freudian soul apparatus. Philosophical interior research and the psychology of the unconscious only overlap in a few places, as we shall see; if we occasionally borrow from psychoanalytical notions in the follOWing, it is only because the material permits and suggests it, not because we view the school as an authority. If we were to invoke a genius for this first part of the Spheres enterprise, one of the foremost candidates would " he Caston Bachelard, who, with his phenomenology of material imagination, especially his studies on the psychoanalysis of the dements, created a valuable 'Store of brilliant insights to which we shall return 'on several occasions. In his idea-laden 1948 hook La terre et les reveries du repos [The Earth and Reveries of Rest], the authoT gathered together diverse material concerning the dreams of material intimacy: birth houses and dream houses, grottos, labyrinths, snakes, and above all the aforementioned Jonah complex, which places every human being who knows freedom simultaneously into an unmistakable relationship with an enabling interior darkness. In this work, Bachelard notes that simply by looking inwards, every person becomes a Jonah-or, mote precisely, becomes prophet and whale in a single body. The great phenomenologist of the experienced space did not forget to name the reason fat this: The unconscious is as sure of the closure of the circle as the most skilled geometrician: if one lets the reveries of intimacy take their course, [ ... ] the dreaming hand will draw the original circle. It seems, then, as if the unconscious itself knew a Parmwidean sphere as the symbol of being. This sphere does not possess the rational beauties of geometric volume, but it offers the great securities of a belly.41 We shall attempt in the following to develop these indispensable intuitions further. Bur we will also have ttl exceed their boundaries for the purpose of unfolding them, as we need to explain why the consubjecrive, intimate sphere can initially by no means possess a eucyclic or Parmenidean structure: the primitive mental orb, unlike the beautifully rounded philosophical one, does not have a center of its own that radiates and collects everything, bur rather two epicenters that evoke each other through resonance. Furthermore, it transpires that the inside of the soul grottos will not always remain exclusively a place of quiet happiness. The innermost access to your living cell is often reserved, as we can see, for a voice that wishes to reduce or deny the possihility of your existence. It characterizes the basic risk of all intimacy that our destroyer sometimes gets closer to us than our ally.' (pp. 98-100)
ConclusionThere will one day be one.
Footnotes I was able to download the book with my mobile (but not my computer) from the address: https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache%3AurhjkKLUhjkJ%3Ahttps%3A%2F%2Fmonoskop.org%2FFile%3ASloterdijk_Peter_Bubbles_Spheres_I_Microspherology.pdf
 Sloterdijk uses the inscriptions from Platos academy to begin his argumentation about collectivity and the formation of bubbles where convivial interaction can take place. The two inscriptions are: '[l]et no one enter who is not a geometrician.' (pp.9) and 'that whoever was unwilling to become entangled in love affairs with other visitors in the garden of theory should keep away.' (pp.11) The point being that philosophy acts as a catalyst for a hubris that 'changes camps: the exclusivity of philosophy is expressed not in its own presumptuousness, but in rhe self~gratiflcation -of those who are certain of being able to dispense with philosophical thought. If philosophy is exclusive, it mirrors most people's self~exclusion from the best-in exaggerating the existing division in society, however, it creates an awareness of these exclusions and puts them to the vote again. Philosophical exaggeration provides an opportunity to revise completed options and decide against exclusion', (pp.11) and also that '[i]f others see something else as the best, and achieve something convincing as a result, then so much the better." (pp.12) It is important to note that I am not critiquing the evident instrumentalist or pragmatic notions in these comments.
 Humans are quite clearly evolving towards greater and greater self destruction.
 I am referring with the title to Jean-Luc Nancy's book Singular Plural because of the complex by which Sloterdijk begins the creation of the community, and also because it, as well as all the other books of Nancy aught to be read by the reader of this text as much as Spheres.
 The psyche extended is analysed in detail in Jaques Derrida's On touching Jean-Luc Nancy.
 That something is your concern is the heart of the formation of a polis and of any justice system or policy development that considers time to be non-retrogradable. Meaning that when a concern is raised it must be acted on immediately, rather than at some later date by which it no longer can be stopped. This is essential and vital to any good society.
 Here is one division that can be explored that I have not seen Sloterdijk explore. That the cell can divide on the inside, rather than merely be impinged and interrupted or disrupted. This is what can in one type of mental formations, keeping to religious symbolisms, be called the missionary position, which uses human replication in conjunction with sphere formation in order to expand its communal position and power. This is a method difficult to understand in modern terms because it plays the game at a very different tempo to the one being played by modern society. In regards to this idea, looking at the division of the internal as a typology it is possible to approach an unknown whose phenomenolgy would include consensual division in a holographic way.
 'Are humans really lasting?' is question the Anthropocene is living by.
 Those who understand and read about knowledge will recognize that it is this particular that is at the heart of the problem of the post-modern age, one which nobody has been able to apporach in any meaningful way from Wolfram to Sloterdijk.
 Is stupidity always identical? This question could be answered by cutting a cross section while assuming the identical nature of each, which would reveal this nature.
 Read: We Never Make Mistakes by Alexandr Isayevich Solzhenitsyn.
 Ideologically in spatial term gentrification and the valuation of location works against the positive nature of this tendency. In terms of spheres organization of space should be based on similarity of ideals rather than monetary value.
For a physical descirption of foam (very interesting in this context) is: https://science.nasa.gov/science-news/science-at-nasa/2003/09jun_foam which says:
'The critical point of a foam occurs when the liquid content is so high (roughly 37% by volume) that the air bubbles are completely spherical and only touch each other at one point, like steel ball bearings piled together in a jar. That's when the foam ceases to act like a semi-solid stack of bubbles and begins acting instead like bubbles floating freely inside a flowing liquid--a "phase change" of sorts.'
 This is the title of the chapter starting on page 83.